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THE IMPACT OF OPTION LISTINGS: 
A STUDY OF CASINO AND GAMING STOCKS 
Stanley M. Atkinson 
Anthony K. Byrd 
and 
Gary E. Porter 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of option listings on the common stock of 21 
firms specializing in the casino and gaming industry. Our results show that, on av- 
erage, there is a sigmhcant decrease in price during the five-day window which in- 
dudes the announcement of the listing, the listing day, and a two-day period fol- 
lowing the listing during which a liquid market is created in the option. However, 
we also show that stock prices recover subsequent to the listing window and that 
there is no evidence of a permanent change in stock price resulting from the listing. 
We find a sigruficant decline in trading volume bepming two days prior to the list- 
ing, suggesting that the option market displaces trades of a sigruficant number of 
shares following the listing. Finally, we find a sigruficant dedine in firm-specific risk 
following the listing, but do not find a change in systematic risk. This result sug- 
gests that while the introduction of option trading does not change the relationship 
between these stocks' returns and market returns, the additional outlet for specula- 
tors reduces volatility surrounding firm-specific news, lowering the total risk of 
these stocks. 
Introduction 
A number of studies have documented the impact of an option listing on the perfor- 
mance of the underlying stock. Unfortunately for the investor, the implications of the 
studies have not been consistent. Trennepoll and Dukes (1979) and Detemple and Jorion 
(1989) conclude that the introduction of an option reduces the volatility of the underlying 
stock. BoUen (1995) finds "a dramatic increase" in the volatility of the underlying stock, 
but shows that the increase is linked to increases in market volatility, not the introduction 
of the option. He also concludes that increases in trading volume following option list- 
ings are not different than changes for an industry-matched control sample. Conrad 
(1989) provides evidence that, beginning three days prior to the introduction of the op- 
tion, the listing results in a permanent stock price increase. But Detemple and Jorion 
(1989) report that stock price increases in their sample of listings were less pronounced 
toward the end of the sample period, implying that the marginal impact of additional 
options, especially those within the same industry, diminishes. 
Conflicting evidence of postlisting behavior indicates that, even though the listings 
are announced several days prior their introduction, the market is unable, on average, to 
anticipate, and therefore price, the impact of the listing. This study provides evidence of 
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TABLE 1 
Casino and Gaming Option Listings 
1976-1995 
Company SIC Code Listing Date Exchange 
Aztar 7011 930406 CBOE 
Bally Entertainment 7011 930709 CBOE 
Bally Gaming 3990 920803 AMEX 
Boomtown 7990 930604 CBOE 
Boyd Gaming 5099 940419 PHLX 
Caesar's World (1) 7011 800519 PHLX 
Caesar's World (2) 7011 850610 AMEX 
Casino America 7990 930824 CBOE, PHLX, PSE 
Casino Magic 7990 930625 AMEX, CBOE, PHLX, PSE 
Circus Circus 7011 861001 AMEX 
Hilton Hotels 7011 761018 AMEX 
Hollywood Casino 7010 950619 PSE 
International Game Technology 3990 900801 AMEX, PSE 
Jackpot 7993 930422 AMEX 
Mirage 7999 830817 CBOE 
Players International 7990 930712 AMEX 
Resorts International 7011 800121 AMEX, CBOE, PSE 
Rio Hotel and Casino 7011 930330 CBOE 
Sdentific Game Holding 7376 950502 AMEX, CBOE 
Showboat 7011 930330 CBOE 
Wdeo Lottery Technology 3990 930802 AMEX, CBOE 
AMEX-American Stock Exchange. CBOE-Chicago Board Options Exchange. PHLX-Philadel- 
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from the stock. We use the method described by Healy and Palepu (1990) for measuring 
the firm-specific volatility in our sample. They start with the market model: 
where Rj = the return on security i at time j. 
R, = the return on the market portfolio at time j. 
pi  = the beta, or measure of systematic risk for security i. 
Eij = the component of returns which is not correlated with the returns on 
the market, where E is mean zero with variance @. 
The total variance of returns can now be stated as, 
Var(R) = Pf Var (R,,,) + 02 (2) 
where dr is the unsystematic component of total variance. Speculators and day traders can 
add volatility to stock returns through frequent trading on new information. If they can 
exploit new information about a security more effiaently through the option market, and 
if, as Black and Scholes suggest, the trading options do not impact the pricing of the under- 
lying asset, then the impact of speculators' trades on stock price volatility can be reduced or 
eliminated. As such, there should be a decline in the firm-specific, or unsystematic compo- 
nent, of total risk following the listing of options on the stock. 
Results 
Price Changes 
Table 2 presents the results of our event study for 21 casino and gaming firms listing 
options between 1976 and 1995, for which at least 180 days of return data were available 
prior to the listing. Bold figures represent Average Prediction Errors (APEs) which are 
greater than zero at the 5% level of signhcance. On these days, the average return for our 
sample firms s i e c a n t l y  exceeds the return predicted by the market model. 
The high volatility of the industry is reflected in the high number of significant APEs 
prior to the option listing. Of the six significant APEs prior to listing, only one is negative 
(day t = -24). Table 3 reveals that the apparent 3.73% CAPE prior to the listing is not 
significantly different from zero. This suggests that there is little reason to believe that 
options are-introduced at a time of unexpected increases in stock price. Similarly, there is 
no unanticipated change in price for the 5 days prior to the listing. 
The window t = -2 through t = +2 captures three components of the listing event. 
Day t = -2 through t = - 1 is most likely to capture any announcement of the listing4 
Listing announcement dates were available for only one of the 21 stocks in our sample. 
Prior studies have noted that announcement dates range from 1 to 2 days prior to thelisting of the 
option. In many cases, the listing date and the announcement date are the same. 
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TABLE 2 
Casino and Gaming Option Listings, 
1976-1995 
APES of 21 Listings 
Day Average Prediction Error Z-stat 
- 30 0.000602 - 0.33557 
- 29 0.022322 3.34761 
- 28 0.012508 2.12454 
- 27 0.000133 - 0.19211 
- 26 - 0.003361 - 0.43884 
- 25 0.000847 0.34558 
- 24 - 0.021630 - 3.04537 
- 23 - 0.003277 - 0.59125 
- 22 0.000619 - 0.29109 
- 21 - 0.001938 - 0.63714 
- 20 0.020018 2.50444 
- 19 - 0.001083 0.02750 
- 18 0.004106 0.27498 
- 17 0.000859 0.38681 
- 16 - 0.003733 0.09646 
- 15 0.008357 1.11825 
- 14 - 0.007103 - 1.16079 
- 13 0.015440 2.10802 
- 12 0.002767 0.52270 
- 11 - 0.003356 - 0.58151 
- 10 - 0.001433 - 0.36282 
-9 - 0.009109 - 1.14065 
-8 - 0.001746 - 0.20084 
-7 0.010364 2.24944 
-6 - 0.001944 - 0.10672 
-5 - 0.000888 - 0.23380 
-4 0.004644 0.66190 
-3 0.007421 0.91506 
-2 - 0.005943 - 0.99353 
-1 - 0.003519 - 0.12030 
0 - 0.003633 - 0.56223 
+1 - 0.000888 - 0.08675 
+2 - 0.016462 - 2.92565 
+3 - 0.001342 0.33371 
+4 0.014922 2.10561 
+5 0.001034 0.76500 
+6 - 0.003475 - 0.16649 
+7 - 0.001444 - 0.18413 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Casino and Gaming Option Listings, 
1976-1995 
APEs of 21 Listings 
+8 0.000365 0.35157 
+9 0.007647 1.46307 
+10 - 0.001418 - 0.30517 
+11 - 0.016651 - 2.38133 
+12 - 0.000884 - 0.19873 
+13 - 0.002127 - 0.33164 
+14 - 0.003169 - 0.39229 
+15 - 0.001150 0.12753 
+16 0.001802 0.73907 
+17 0.000133 0.09314 
+18 - 0.012637 - 1.66596 
+19 0.001351 0.32880 
+20 0.002252 0.73505 
+21 0.004741 0.77825 
+22 - 0.004800 - 0.81390 
+23 0.000637 0.47702 
+24 0.002233 0.50635 
+25 - 0.000139 0.21 741 
+26 - 0.000518 0.05918 
+27 0.007916 1.00763 
+28 0.012764 2.28696 
+29 - 0.012533 - 1.81240 
+30 - 0.010674 - 1.63205 
Values in bold are sigruficantly different from zero at the 5% level, two-tail 
test. 
Day t = 0, listing day, is the day options begin to trade on the listed stock. The two days 
following the listing capture the creation of a liquid market for the options. While all 5 days 
in the window appear to contain negative APEs, only on day f = +2 is the APE significantly 
different from zero ( - 1.65%, p-value = 0.0081). The window t = -2 through t = +2 has a 
CAPE of - 3.04% (p-value = 0.0647). This suggests that, on average, from the announce- 
ment of the listing through the establishment of a liquid market, there is a significant drop 
in stock price. This evidence is consistent with negative price pressure beginning with the 
announcement of the option listing and extending past the listing date as speculators trade 
fewer shares and more options. The significant recovery on day t = +4 (1.5%, p-value = 
0.0470) reflects a return to fair value following the period of negative price pressure. The 
CAPES for f = 0 through t = +5 ( - 0.64%, p-value = 0.8900), t = 0 through t = 30 ( - 3.61 %, 
p-value = 0.8744), and t = +3 through t = +30 ( - 1.51%, pvalue = 0.6876) confirm that, on 
average, the listing of the option has only a temporary impact on the stock price of the list- 
ing firms. 
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TABLE 4 
Casino and Gaming Options Listings 
1976-1995 
Changes in Daily Trading Volume By Day 
Difference 
Group Time Period Mean Volume from Significance 
S hares/day Prior Period p-value 
Base: 
- 50 through - 9 194,304 - - 
1 - 8 through - 3 255,106 60,802 0.0531 
Listing Window: 
- 2 through +2 180,854 - 74,252 0.0294 
+3 through +50 179,189 - 1,665 0.9260 
Prelis ting: 
- 50 through - 1 200,885 - 2 - 
Pos tlisting 
0 through +50 1 79,461 - 21,424 0.0614 
Prelisting Window: 
- 50 through - 3 201,905 - - 3 
Postlisting Window: 
+3 through +50 179,189 - 22,716 0.0480 
window beginning on the eighth day prior to listing and extending through day t = - 3, 
volume increases s iecantly,  to 255,106 shares per day (pvalue = 0.0531). During the 
5-day listing window (t = - 2 through t = +2), which is designed to capture the option 
listing announcement and the listing itself and provide the creation of a liquid option mar- 
ket, volume drops significantly to 180,854 shares per day. The listing window average is 
sigruficantly lower than the average for the period t = - 8 through t = - 3 (p-value = 
0.0294). The last period in Group 1 shows that average tradingvolume does not change for 
the 48 days following our listing window. 

TABLE 5 
Casino and Gaming Options Listings 
1976-1 995 
Changes in Systematic Risk 
Company Prelisting f3 Postlisting f3 Difference % Change 
Aztar 1.6857 1.6779 - 0.0078 - 0.47 
Bally Entertainment 2.7711 1.0248 - 1.7463 - 63.02 
Caesar's World (1) 0.9176 1.4952 0.5776 62.95 
Caesar's World (2) 1.9511 2.2275 0.2764 14.17 
Casino America 2.7418 2.0456 - 0.6962 - 25.39 
Circus Circus 2.0051 1.4089 - 0.5962 - 29.73 
Hilton Hotels 1.1161 1.501 0.3849 34.49 
International Game Technology 1.6697 1.8719 0.2023 12.11 
Jackpot 2.1821 1.4985 - 0.6836 - 31.33 
Mirage 1.3373 2.5539 1.2166 90.97 
Players International 2.9384 2.9052 - 0.0333 - 1.13 
Resorts International 1.8742 1.0452 - 0.8291 - 44.23 
Rio Hotel and Casino 1.6907 1 .8407 0.1500 8.88 
Showboat 1.7824 2.4720 0.6897 38.69 
Video Lottery Technology 3.6102 0.8364 - 2.7738 - 76.83 
Minimum 0.9176 0.8364 - 2.7738 - 76.83 
Max 3.6102 2.9052 1.2166 90.97 
Mean 2.0182 1.7603 - 0.2579 - 0.65 
Standard Error 0.2611 
t-statistic 0.9877 
Prob > t - - 0.3401 - 
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TABLE 6 
Casino and Gaming Options Listings 
1976-1995 
Changes in Unsystematic Risk 
Prelisting Postlisting 
Company variance variance Difference % Change 
Aztar 0.000880 0.000871 - 0.000009 - 1.01 
Sally Entertainment 0.001150 0.000513 - 0.000638 - 55.43 
Caesar's World (1) 0.001841 0.000806 - 0.001035 - 56.20 
Caesar's World (2) 0.000440 0.000364 - 0.000076 - 17.32 
Casino America 0.001940 0.001497 -0.000443 -22.85 
Circus Circus 0.000343 0.000372 0.000029 8.34 
Hilton Hotels 0.000350 0.000329 - 0.000021 - 6.00 
International Game Technology 0.000436 0.000926 0.000491 112.63 
Jackpot 0.000706 0.000727 0.000021 2.90 
Mirage 0.000607 0.000510 - 0.000097 - 15.92 
Players International 0.002460 0.000972 - 0.001488 - 60.48 
Resorts International 0.001233 0.000645 - 0.000588 - 47.68 
Rio Hotel and Casino 0.001356 0.000675 - 0.000681 - 50.23 
Showboat 0.000881 0.001070 0.000189 21.48 
Video Lottery Technology 0.003584 0.001641 - 0.001907 - 53.74 
Minimum 0.000343 0.000329 - 0.001907 - 60.48 
Max 0.003548 0.001641 0.000491 112.63 
Mean 0.001211 0.000796 - 0.000416 - 16.10 
Standard Error 0.000234 0.000101 0.000169 11.55 
t-statistic - - - 2.4623 - 
Prob > t - - 0.0274 - 
I j 
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I TABLE 7 
Casino and Gaming Options Listings 
1976-1995 
CAPES and Changes in Unsystematic Risk, by Year and by Firm 
CAPE Changes in 
Year Company t = - 2 through t = +2 Unsystematic Risk % 
1976 Hilton Hotels - 0.0108 - 6.00 
1980 Caesar's World (1) - 0.0374 - 56.20 
Resorts International 0.0232 - 47.68 
1983 Mirage - 0.1075 - 15.92 
1985 Caesar's World (2) 0.0031 - 17.32 
1986 Circus Circus - 0.0112 8.34 
1990 International Game Technology - 0.1120 112.63 
1992 Bally Gaming 0.0174 * 
1993 Aztar - 0.0159 - 1.01 
Bally Entertainment 0.0553 - 55.43 
Boomtown - 0.1230 * 
Casino America 0.0242 - 22.85 
Casino Magic - 0.1849 * 
Jackpot - 0.0084 2.90 
Players International - 0.0358 - 60.48 
Rio Hotel and Casino - 0.0640 - 50.23 
Showboat - 0.1079 21.48 
%deo Lottery Technology 0.0879 - 53.74 
1994 Boyd Gaming 0.0087 * 
1995 Hollywood Casino - 0.0087 * 
Scientific Game Holding - 0.0316 * 
*Complete data are not available. 
Mean 1993 - 0.0243 - 3.164 
Mean all other years - 0.0373 - 27.42 
Prob > t 0.6624 0.3122 

